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Out of the Closet and Into the Courts:
Homosexual Fathers and Child Custody
I. Introduction
I am, at once, taunted and threatened with poverty. That I
can bear. I can school myself to worse than that. But my two
children are taken from me by legal procedure. This is and al-
ways will remain to me a source of infinite distress, of infinite
pain, of grief without end or limit. That the law should decide
and take it upon itself to decide, that I am one unfit to be with
my own children is something quite horrible to me. The disgrace
of prison is as nothing compared to it.'
Nearly everyone in the legal and nonlegal world has been ex-
posed to the bitter struggle which ensues between parents in child
custody and visitation proceedings. This struggle has been particu-
larly difficult for fathers seeking custody of their children, and is
reflected in the media, legal periodicals, and films such as Kramer v.
Kramer.$ For the father who is also a homosexual," however, that
struggle is seemingly insurmountable, as the homosexual father faces
the obstacles in court of both his gender and his sexual preference.
Indeed, many admitted homosexual fathers view these obstacles
as impossible to overcome. Even if custody is within reach, the battle
for it can become very costly for both parents. Other homosexual
1. RUPERT HART-DAvis, THE LETrERS OF OSCAR WILDE 464-65 (1962). Oscar Wilde
wrote this letter to his lover, Lord Alfred Douglas, while he served a prison sentence for sod-
omy and had just learned of the loss of custody of his children. Id.
2. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
3. History has turned the table on the rights of fathers. Indeed, "[ulp to the turn of the
century, American fathers had always been granted sole custody [of their children], regardless
of the circumstances." C. WARE, SHARING PARENTHOOD AFrER DIVORCE 11 (1982). With the
Industrial Revolution, however, fathers left the farms for the factories and began to accept the
notion that they were not the primary parent. See L. WEITHORN, PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 6-8 (1987).
4. Throughout this comment, the author will use the term "homosexual," as coined and
defined by the Hungarian writer Karoly Maria Benkert, to mean the preference of sexual and
emotional relations with a person of the same sex. See V. BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALITY - A
HISTORY 7 (1979). Benkert's pamphlet on homosexuality was republished and widely dissemi-
nated by Magnus Hirschfeld in VI JAHRBUCH FUR SEXUELLE ZWISCHENSTUFFEN i-iv, 3-66
(1905). Homosexual men comprise approximately 13.95%, or roughly 16 million members of
the total male population. While statistics suggest that twenty-five percent of self-identified
homosexual men father children, the actual figure is probably much higher since most men are
not overt about their sexual preference. Miller, Gay Men and Their Children, 21 FAM. COOR-
DINATOR 544 (1979).
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fathers have yet to emerge from the "closet" and face social reper-
cussions if they reveal their sexual preference before the court and
their peers. While they desire to raise their children, these homosex-
ual parents are left with a Hobson's choice between their sexual
preference and the custody of their children.
This comment examines the problems of homosexual fathers in
custody cases. While there is an abundance of case law and articles
that discuss the rights of lesbian mothers,6 very little has been writ-
ten about homosexual fathers. The comment first briefly examines
the history of the homosexual male in society and the development of
society's present-day sentiment toward homosexuals. Next, the com-
ment focuses on current child custody laws and the criteria that
courts generally consider in awarding custody of a child to a parent.
The comment then addresses the reasoning behind judicial
"homophobia" 7 in child custody cases and suggests that nearly all of
the judicial fears about granting custody to a homosexual father are
unfounded, prejudicial, socially intolerant, and discriminatory
against the homosexual.
The comment proposes a two-pronged attack for the homosex-
ual father to use opposing the judicial intolerance that denies a ho-
mosexual father the right to parent his children. First, the homosex-
ual father should argue for the necessity of judicial proof that the
sexual preference of the parent has a correlation or nexus to the wel-
fare of the child before it can be considered in custody cases.8 Sec-
ond, the homosexual father may argue that his constitutional rights
of privacy, association, and equal protection of the laws are infringed
upon in a denial of custody based upon his sexual preference.9 Ad-
mittedly, however, parental rights are secondary to the best interests
of the child.
Thus, this comment raises three questions: 1) Is the sexual pref-
erence of a parent relevant when the parent is an otherwise loving,
5. While custody and visitation typically go hand-in-hand, this comment focuses on at-
tempts by homosexual men to gain custody of their children.
6. There are approximately one-and-a-half to five million lesbian mothers in society.
Since the average family has two children, even conservative estimates suggest that at least
three million children are currently being raised by lesbian mothers. Since homosexual males
outnumber lesbian women, it seems likely that there would be a comparable number of homo-
sexual fathers in society. In reality, however, such fathers have been all but neglected. See
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the U.S.,
30 HASTINGs L.J. 799 (1979).
7. "Homophobia" or "homophobic" simply means an irrational fear of homosexuals
and/or homosexuality. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 619 (2nd College ed. 1984).
8. See infra notes 108-125 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 126-154 and accompanying text.
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caring, and fit parent? 2) If the sexual preference of a parent is rele-
vant, how does that preference affect the best interests of the child?
And 3) if we find that sexual preference affects the welfare of the
child, is our reasoning rational, or are we merely perpetuating
homophobia stereotypes?'0 In reaching conclusions to these ques-
tions, the reader should consider the crucial role of the courts- when
they are given broad discretion to determine the best interests of par-
ent and child.
II. History-Homosexual Male and Society
A. Roots of Homophobia
Historically, the homosexual male has been subjected to harsh
scrutiny from many varied societies. The sexual preference of the
homosexual male has been called "a sin, an illness, a way of life, a
normal variant of sexual behavior, a behavior disturbance, and a
crime."1 The past history of Western society, both in religious
dogma and societal mores, reflects the roots of homophobia in to-
day's society.
While ancient Greek society accepted and even preferred homo-
sexual love,'" ancient Roman society had very harsh laws against the
practice of homosexuality. Roman law reflected the religious, medi-
cal, and philosophical attitudes about homosexuality that were
spread throughout the Roman Empire. 3
The ancient Jewish religion viewed homosexuality in a similarly
fearful and hostile manner. In Judaism, much of this fear and hostil-
ity stemmed from the notion that the vagina was the proper place for
semen to be deposited, 4 a belief reflected in the teachings of the
10. See Miller, supra note 4, at 544. "[T]o prevent gay men from fathering a child
because he may raise homosexual children is a circular, self-validating argument that perpetu-
ates homophobia ... ." Id.
II. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at I.
12. Id. at 2-4. Plato's Symposium stated that man was created from a four-legged and
four-armed being that the gods divided into two persons. Some of these double persons then
spent the rest of their lives attempting to get back their other half, and thus heterosexual and
homosexual love was part of nature's plan. S. ROSEN, PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM (2d ed. 1987). Aris-
totle stated in Problemata IV his belief that homosexuality resulted from both hereditary and
environmental factors. ARISTOTLE, PROBLEMATA IV 876-80 (E.S. Forster, trans. 1927). Such
beliefs still exist today in modern society.
13. For example, the Roman Codes under Emperors Theodosius, Valentinian, and Ar-
cadius stated that "[aIll persons who have the shameful custom of condemning a man's body,
acting the part of a woman's, to the sufferance of an alien sex, shall expiate a crime of this
kind by avenging flames in the sight of the people." THE THEODOSIAN CODE, 390 A.D., 231-32
(Clyde Pharr trans. 1952) (advocating the death penalty for oral sex).
14. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at 17.
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Jewish religion.15 Such teachings had a rational as well as moral
base. Survival of the religion depended on sexual reproduction by the
followers, and homosexuality had no value in the sociological scheme
to increase the population.
Interestingly, homosexual men were treated much more harshly
than homosexual women. This dichotomy is somewhat explained be-
cause ancient societies and religions were governed by men and for
men, while these societies regarded women as second-class citizens at
best."6 Thus, in ancient society, just as it is today, lesbianism was not
as strictly scrutinized as male homosexuality. Particularly, early
Jewish culture, in which women were viewed as a subclass of soci-
ety, 1 7 may provide the roots for this contradiction. Jewish scripture
ignores the other sexual practices of women as long as they were
able to provide a fertile environment for the development of the male
semen.' 8 Thus, ancient societies tolerated homosexual activity be-
tween women.
The prohibitions of the Christian religion have also affected the
mores of modern society. These prohibitions came not only in the
New Testament scriptures 9 but also in the writings of the commen-
tators. Probably the most famous of the early critics and classifiers
of sins against nature was St. Thomas Aquinas. His Christian teach-
ings on homosexuality classified four distinct sins against nature: 1)
bestiality, 2) homosexuality, 3) sexual intercourse in an unnatural
position, and 4) masturbation. 0 According to Aquinas, sex was
strictly for procreation, and that was the only reason God made
15. See Leviticus 15:16-18 (King James) ("And if man's seed of copulation go out from
him, then he shall wash all his flesh in water, and be unclean until the evening. And every
garment, and every skin, whereupon is the seed of copulation, shall be washed with water, and
be unclean until the evening.").
16. See generally V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4.
17. The commission, in Genesis 1:28, in which mankind was told to go forth, procreate,
and replenish the earth, was to be obeyed by the male species. See Genesis 1:28 (King James).
Male semen was viewed as the key to procreation, and the female was present only to provide
the proper environment for development. See V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at 18 (citing D.
MACE, HEBREW MARRIAGE 206-07 (1953)).
18. Jewish law fails to apply condemnation of homosexuality to women. See Leviticus
20:13 (King James), stating that "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; and their
blood shall be upon them."
19. Jesus had little to say on the topic of sexuality other than to require celibacy for
those who were to serve God. See generally V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at 17-30. This re-
quirement may be viewed as applicable to both heterosexual and homosexual activity. The
Epistle writers, however, did mention the topic. For example, St. Paul wrote that "[k]now ye
not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the Kindgom of God? Be not deceived: Neither the
fornicators, nor idolators, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with man-
kind . . . shall inherit the Kingdom of God." I Corinthians 6:9-10 (King James).
20. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at 27-28.
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human beings sexual creatures. In this view, all other types of vene-
real activity performed solely for pleasure were immoral and sinful.',
B. Present Rights of Homosexuals
1. Criminal Law.-Modern sodomy statutes developed from
these Christian teachings 2 Presently, twenty-six states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have statutes on the books that outlaw voluntary
consensual homosexual acts. 3 The statutes do not outlaw someone
identifying himself as a homosexual but penalize the actual homo-
sexual acts. Fortunately, even with the recent approval of a Georgia
sodomy statute by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,24
there has been no surge of new legislation criminalizing voluntary
homosexual acts.25
2. Marriage and Religion.-Homosexuals have a strong desire
to fit into the traditional institutions of society, yet such institutions
have not welcomed them. To date, no state or nation has recognized
any formal or legal marriage of persons of the same sex.26 Without
such marriage laws, many gay persons are turning to adoption in
order to legalize their relationships. The same courts that deny
homosexuals the right to custody of and visitation with their chil-
dren, however, are also showing disapproval for same-sex adult adop-
tion.217 Many homosexual couples thus turn to contract law to legal-
21. Id.
22. Sodomy statutes are also categorized as "crimes against nature," "deviant sexual
intercourse," or "buggery." See infra note 23. Such statutes did not, however, include women
until the late nineteenth century. See generally THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES FOUNDATION
OF PENNSYLVANIA, LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: THE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA (1981) [hereinafter
A.C.L.F., LESBIANS AND GAY MEN].
23. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1978);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
800.02 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.010(1), .100(1) (1957); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West 1983); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 554 (1987); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
28.355 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 566.010(1), .090(1) (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(20), § 45-5-505 (1983);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.177 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21 § 886 (West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-2
(1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); TEX. CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1983); and VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1982). These statutes gener-
ally apply to both male and female homosexuals.
24. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
25. The Bowers decision has occasioned no new onslaught of legislation against homo-
sexual acts. The decision does not make it any easier, however, for homosexual rights activists
to convince state legislators to repeal such statutes.
26. See generally A.C.L.F., LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 22.
27. See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E. 2d 424, 481
N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984) (overruling many previous cases permitting same-sex adult adoption).
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ize joint ownership of property and finances and plan for the
relationship's future through wills and medical powers of attorney.28
As in the institution of marriage, the homosexual community
has found little acceptance among religious institutions. Although
many practicing homosexuals are affiliated with churches, few
churches have specifically addressed the issue. Even when churches
have lent support, such support has been superficial and ambigu-
ous. 9 Thus, many homosexuals who wish to continue to practice
their faith, yet are frustrated when their sexual preference is
maligned by their churches, have sought to organize homosexual
churches. Such efforts have yielded little success."0
C. Present Societal Sentiment
The present state of the law regarding the rights of homosexuals
indicates that change has been minimal in society's attitudes toward
homosexuality. Criminal laws penalizing private consensual acts"1
have codified past discriminatory beliefs and reinforced old stereo-
types about homosexuals. These stereotypes are, however, largely in-
accurate. For example, society has perpetuated the myth that male
homosexuals are constantly engaged in sexual activity. Yet, accord-
ing to major studies, males whose behavior is predominantly homo-
sexual actually have less frequent sexual contacts than heterosexual
males. 2 Similarly, the notion that gay men are constantly on the
sexual prowl or "cruising" is a fiction. Again, the commentators sug-
gest that the homosexual male spends far less time "cruising" than
standard societal beliefs would indicate.3" Thus, the basis for many
laws criminalizing homosexual conduct is inaccurate.
28. A.C.L.F., LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 22, at 30-33.
29. See V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at 28-29. For example, in 1970, the Lutheran
Church of America stated that:
Persons who engage in homosexual behavior are sinners only as are all other
persons-alienated from God and neighbor. However, they are often the special
and undeserving victims of prejudice and discrimination in law, law enforce-
ment, cultural mores, and congregational life. In relation to this area of concern,
the sexual behavior of freely consenting adults in private is not an appropriate
subject for legislation or police action. It is essential to see such persons as enti-
tled to justice and understanding in church and community.
Id.
30. Id. at 28. Many homosexuals turn to specific homosexual church groups and sects
that have splintered from traditional religious hierarchy. These churches have developed their
own rituals for marriage ceremonies, which are either similar or identical to traditional hetero-
sexual rituals. While these homosexual marriages are religiously performed, states do not rec-
ognize them, either as legitimate or common law marriages. Id.
31. See statutes cited supra note 23.
32. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIEs 69 (1978).
33. Id. at 73.
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Unfortunately, the interplay between inaccurate societal percep-
tion and the laws governing homosexuals runs a cyclical path. Past
laws influence society's current attitudes, and society in turn enacts
new laws that ignore homosexuals' rights.34 Although legislatures as
law-making bodies are best suited to represent the wishes of the ma-
jority, homosexuals, as an unpopular minority, are rarely a group
whose rights are championed in the nation's statutory enactments.
What our legislatures refuse to do, however, our courts must do. As
will be studied later in this comment, the judiciary is in a unique
position to develop and protect the rights of homosexuals. Thus far,
however, little progress has resulted.
III. Present Law-Child Custody and Fathers
A. Tender Years Doctrine
The process of challenging history is a difficult one, yet every
time a father gains custody of his child, he has successfully chal-
lenged the century-old preference for awarding child custody to the
mother. This preference has been labelled the Tender Years
Doctrine.
The Tender Years Doctrine, in brief, favors the placement of
children who are younger than a certain age-of "tender
years "5--exclusively with their mother, except in rare situations
when extraordinary circumstances exist." Fortunately, although the
doctrine was once popular in many states,3 7 it has become subject to
criticism and rejection in recent years.3 8 Yet despite expressly dis-
avowing the doctrine, many courts nevertheless have implicitly disre-
garded these recent trends and retained their traditional preference
34. Interestingly, studies have found that there are higher incidences of homosexual be-
havior in groups that most often express disgust with the behavior, such as persons or groups
who wish to ridicule, punish, or condemn homosexual activity. See A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY &
C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 383-87 (1948). For example, Ernest
Roehm, a prominent founder of the Nazi Party, was a homosexual. As Roehm's sexuality
became public knowledge, Hitler adopted a policy of support. After 1933, however, when
Hitler seized a better grasp on power, Roehm was executed, and the Third Reich began its
brutal policy of scapegoating homosexuals. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at 92-93.
35. The maximum age varied greatly, but the typical age range set by the states was
usually anywhere from 7 years to as high as 14 years of age. See S. KRAM & N. FRANK, THE
LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 21-41 (1982) [hereinafter
SUBSTANTIVE LAW].
36. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, NEW TRENDS IN CHILD CUS-
TODY DETERMINATION, 29-30 (1980) [hereinafter NEW TRENDS]. Indeed, "[lit has become a
psychological truism that mothers bond more meaningfully with their offspring." C. WARE,
supra note 3, at 11.
37. L. WEITHORN, supra note 3, at 7-8.
38. S. Kram & N. Frank, The Future of Tender Years, TRIAL, April 1976, at 14.
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for awarding custody to the mother.39 In ninety percent of today's
custody battles, the mother still wins sole custody.40 This lingering
application of previous law remains the most difficult hurdle for fa-
thers in child custody suits.
41
B. Best Interests Doctrine
A majority of jurisdictions have now adopted some version of
the "Best Interests of the Child" doctrine.4 Under this doctrine, the
court first considers the physical, mental, and emotional well-being
of the child. The court then determines the present status of the
child, the development of the child with the present custodial parent,
and any preference the child may have toward a certain parent.43
Society's view of a parent's moral fitness, in the view of Justice Ben-
jamin Cardozo, the developer of the test, was irrelevant under the
Best Interests test.44
Under the Best Interests Doctrine, the psychological relation-
ship of the parent and child is emphasized rather than the biological
relationship. 8 Courts consider not only which parent provides the
traditional child-rearing role but also which parent can provide the
most love and attention for the child. When both parents are able to
provide equally for a child, the courts then turn to a secondary factor
in the doctrine: the parental fitness test. Under the fitness test, courts
have broad discretion to determine the level of fitness a parent must
achieve before being awarded custody.' 6 Courts will generally con-
39. NEW TRENDS, supra note 36, at 29-30. In Pennsylvania, for example, although case
law explicitly abandoned the Tender Years Doctrine in the early 1970's, some courts have
continued to rely on its underlying principles. See, e.g., Scheeler v. Rudy, 2 D. & C.3d 772
(Franklin Co. 1977) (modifying and relabeling the doctrine to make it meet today's
standards).
40. C. WARE, supra note 3, at 11.
41. See NEW TRENDS, supra note 36, at 29. "In spite of the fact that fathers are begin-
ning to win custody of their children, the mother remains the favorite in custody contests, even
when state statutes specify that both parents have equal rights to child custody. The mother
who seeks child custody usually gets it because of the common assumption that she is the best
parent suited for child rearing." Id.
42. See generally GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, SOLNICH & GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1986) [hereinafter BEST INTERESTS].
43. SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 35, at 51-54.
44. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). The only reason to
consider parental moral fitness is to determine how the practice would hurt the child. See
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 886 (1979) ("The law will not
hold the crowd to the morality of saints and seers.").
45. See NEW TRENDS, supra note 36, at 21.
46. BEST INTERESTS, supra note 42, at 23. In many instances, trial court judges are
assuming roles as psychologists in determining who is a fit or unfit parent. In most situations,
the court has no proper educational experience in making such findings. The judges simply rely
on courtroom observations in determining fitness. Id. While under the doctrine of parens pa-
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sider alcohol and drug disorders, mental and emotional health,"" and
sexual preferences and practices of the parent as information rele-
vant to the fitness of the parent. "8
In Stanley v. Illinois,"9 the Supreme Court addressed the appli-
cation of the fitness test to fathers seeking custody. In finding that
unwed fathers must be guaranteed individual determination of their
fitness before removal or denial of child custody, the Court struck
down, as a violation of the due process clause, an irrebuttable statu-
tory presumption against fathers.50 While vindicating the custody
rights of fathers in general, the Stanley rationale was largely ignored
by courts determining the custody rights of homosexual fathers.
Until recently, most courts have held that homosexual fathers,
solely on the basis of their homosexuality, failed the parental fitness
test. Although the recent trend is to move away from homosexuality
as per se unfitness, 51 the attitude of per se unfitness still lingers today
in many custody courts. 52 For example, in In re Marriage of Cabal-
quinto,53 the trial court judge strongly expressed his opinion on the
unfitness of homosexual fathers by stating that "a child should be
led in the way of a heterosexual preference, not be tolerant of homo-
sexuality, and thus it could not do any good to live in a homosexual
environment. It might do some harm."54 It is thus clear that some
courts still view a homosexual father as morally unfit to rear a child,
regardless of his actual ability to raise the child."'
Finally, along with parental fitness, capability to provide for the
well-being of the child, parent/child preference, and existing parent/
child relationships, the Best Interests Doctrine focuses on which par-
triae, the state is to determine the best interests of a child in a custody matter, the state does
not have the means to fulfill the delicate family and parental obligations needed for a child,
such as education, guidance, and nurturing. The state does not "have the capacity to supervise
the fragile, complex interpersonal bonds between child and parent. As parens patriae, the state
is too crude an instrument to become an adequate substitute for flesh and blood parents."
GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, AND SOLNICH, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12 (1979).
47. A history of mental illness, however, will not in and of itself be equated as a signal
of ineffective parenting. See NEW TRENDS, supra note 36, at 95.
48. See M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982).
49. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
50. Id. at 651-52.
51. See, e.g., D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "the
proper rule [is] that homosexuality standing alone without evidence of any adverse effect upon
the welfare of the child does not render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have
custody of the child.").
52. See NEw TRENDS, supra note 36, at 21.
53. 100 Wash.2d 325, 669 P.2d 886 (1983).
54. Id. at 328, 669 P.2d at 888.
55. NEw TRENDS, supra note 36, at 23. But cf. id. at 21 ("What constitutes a 'fit' or
,unfit' parent depends largely on whether or not there is a consensus on parental obligations
and norms of behavior.").
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ent can provide the best and most stable family unit. 56 It is when
evaluating this consideration that courts allow parental lifestyles to
be a most important factor, and the homosexual father usually must
choose between the lifestyle that he prefers, which often includes
having a live-in companion and other homosexual friends visit, or
gaining custody of his child. Such a choice is necessary because
courts generally view the raising of a child in a homosexual family
comprised of two homosexual men as an improper environment.5"
For fathers and especially homosexual fathers, courts have been re-
luctant to agree that "prevailing values regarding family styles do
not necessarily correlate with parenting capabilities. '5 8
Thus, no matter which doctrine is followed by the particular
custody court-whether Tender Years or Best Interests-all fathers
must meet rigid standards in child custody suits. For homosexual
fathers, these standards are virtually impossible to meet. The homo-
sexual father must deal not only with the disadvantage of his gender
and the abundance of "Mom power" 59 in the courts, he also must
deal with the unspoken prejudice against his sexual preference and
lifestyle in front of a generally homophobic judiciary.
IV. Our Homophobic Judiciary-Addressing Its Fears
Homophobia has appeared in societies throughout history.
Homosexuals were blamed for the fall of the Roman empire, exe-
cuted as witches during colonization, exterminated and ostracized in
Nazi Germany, and accused of Communist sympathy by Joseph Mc-
Carthy in the 1950's.11 Inevitably, the judges who now sit on the
custody court benches across the nation and who have read the same
history books have adopted the same irrational fear. Thus, nearly
every time an attorney and his homosexual client step into a custody
56. See id. at 96. "Family unit" does not necessarily mean the traditional nucleus family
framework. Rather, "family unit" focuses on the love and attention given to the child, eco-
nomic security, education, and environment for growth. The specific arrangement of the house-
hold is of little importance as long as the needs of the child are reached. Id. See also G.
MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1949).
57. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 108
A.D.2d 120, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1985). It should be noted, though, that when there is a mere-
tricious heterosexual relationship between a custodial parent and a third party, courts will
generally give little weight to the relationship in a custody determination, unless it can be
proven that the meretricious relationship has an adverse, harmful effect on the child. See gen-
erally Commonwealth ex. rel. Myers v. Myers, 468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976) (stating the
present law on meretricious relationships affecting child custody).
58. NEW TRENDS, supra note 36, at 96.
59. See C. WARE, supra note 3, at 45 ("Fathers who ask for custody should keep in
mind the decades of programming that have gone into the creation of 'Mom power.' ").
60. See generally V. BULLOUGH, supra note 4, at 89-101.
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court, they will have the unenviable task of reeducating a judge on
the facts and myths of homosexuality. Yet, as unenviable as it may
be, the task is not unachievable. Success can be achieved by efforts
to address and alleviate these fears through rational analysis.
A. Sexual Exploitation by the Father
Some courts fear that the homosexual father will molest or sex-
ually abuse his children upon receiving custody, especially those fa-
thers who are given custody of young sons. a" While this fear has
been recently fueled by moral and religious leaders who have used
the homosexual as a scapegoat for society," it is a myth that homo-
sexual parents are necessarily child molesters and that homosexual-
ity is perpetuated when a young man is seduced by an older man."
In reality, studies of child molestation suggest that sexual molesta-
tion of children is much more likely to be performed by heterosexual
rather than homosexual men." Any type of abusive sexual activity
among homosexual men is rare, and homosexual men on the whole
are not attracted to children on any sexual basis.65 There exists only
scant evidence of incidents involving fathers who have attempted to
engage in homosexual activity with their children. 6 Thus, judicial
predeterminations about homosexual men as child molesters are in-
valid, and the homosexual father in a custody suit should present
evidence of this invalidity to the court.
B. Psychosexual Development of the Child
Courts sometimes deny custody to the homosexual father be-
cause of fears that the children will psychosexually develop homosex-
ual preferences through contact with the homosexual father and his
61. See In re J.S. and C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 142
N.J. Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1976).
62. Cf. J. MARMOR, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, 219-31 (1980). With the surfacing of ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") and its link to the male homosexual commu-
nity, religious leaders in the late 1980s have gained more fuel for their crusade against
homosexuals.
63. See A. BELL, M. WEINBERG & J. HAMMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE 185 (1978)
[hereinafter SEXUAL PREFERENCE).
64. See Susoeff, Assessing a Child's Best Interest When a Parent is Gay, 32 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 852, 881 n.185 (1985). A research report in 1961 found child molestation unlikely in
homosexual men. One study found all instances of child molestation by parents were per-
formed by heterosexual parents and not homosexuals. Id.
65. See generally A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIFS (1978). See also Baker
v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
66. See McKinney v. Alabama Dept. of Pensions and Services, 475 So.2d 568 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1985) in which a father on appeal was denied removal of a temporary restriction on his
visitation rights on the basis of his attempts to engage in homosexual activity with one child.
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friends. This fear of developing homosexual children is unfounded.
Commentators now suggest that the development of sexuality is not
based mainly on parental sexual preferences and practices, as had
been previously accepted. 67 Rather, these experts agree that homo-
sexuality is caused by genetic factors and social conditioning. 8 Fi-
nally, experts further agree that sexual preference is developed
before adolescence, somewhere between the ages of 3 and 6.69 Such
evidence must be considered in the context of the behavior of par-
ents, who, whether homosexual or heterosexual, usually avoid dis-
cussing details of their sexuality with young children. Indeed, "[iut
may be difficult for children to imagine parents, regardless of the
parent's sexual orientation, in any sexual context . . .-.
Such evidence strongly negates society's faulty presumption that
parental sexual preference affects the sexual preference of children.
Indeed, many homosexuals in society today come from the ideal het-
erosexual family model, while many heterosexuals grew up in fami-
lies with homosexual parents.71 Thus, it appears that children adopt
their own sexual preferences, independent from any parental influ-
ences, and that, regardless of the parents' sexual preferences, chil-
dren will experience gender identification problems randomly. Again,
the burden falls on the homosexual father in a child custody suit to
bring forth such evidence in order to address this fear of the courts.
In such endeavors, some fathers have been successful, 72 and others
67. See SEXUAL PREFERENCE, supra note 63, at 183-84 ("[C]ontrary to widely accepted
psychodynamic theories that have generally considered homosexuality to be the outcome of
certain types of parental relationships of traits, we find that the role of the parents in the
sexual development of their [children] to be grossly exaggerated.").
68. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982); SCHOFIELD, THE SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR OF YOUNG PEOPLE (1965). Most experts disagree as to the extent these factors
determine the development of sexuality. See SEXUAL PREFERENCE, supra note 63, at 183-84.
69. See Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1131 n.19. See also SEXUAL PREFERENCE, supra note
63, at 186 (stating that "[b]y the time boys or girls reach adolescence, sexual preferences are
likely to be determined even if sexual activity has not begun."). Miller, supra note 4, at 544
(suggesting that "separating children from a loving father, regardless of his [sexual] orienta-
tion, may do more harm than good").
70. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES 170 (1978).
71. See generally A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
MALE (1948). See also SEXUAL PREFERENCE, supra note 63, at 184 ("Our findings indicate
that boys who grow up with dominant mothers and weak fathers have nearly the same chances
of becoming homosexual as they would if they grew up in the 'ideal' family setting."). Studies
show that knowledge by older children who realized their parent's homosexual preference had
little or no effect on the parent/child relationship. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALI-
TIES 170 (1978). See also Kirkpatrick, Smith, and Roy, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children:
A Comparative Study, 51 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545 (1981) (reporting that research
on causes of homosexuality proves there is no correlation between the parent's sexual prefer-
ence and that of the child).
72. See In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wash.2d 325, 669 P.2d 886 (1983) (homo-
sexual father stating that son could choose the kind of life he wanted to lead); Conkel v.
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have not.7 s The determinative factor lies in presenting the court evi-
dence that will refute the fear that the parent's homosexual prefer-
ence will influence the psychosexual development of the child.
C. Homosexual Conduct as a Crime or Mental Illness
It is not a crime to be a homosexual and even voluntary and
consensual homosexual activity is a crime in only 26 states. 74 Yet
many courts nevertheless will imply that homosexuality is a criminal
act 75 and thus fear placing a child with such a "criminal." Such ar-
guments are irrelevant for determining who will be the custodial par-
ent. Society places penalties on other types of crimes, but does not
usually consider such crimes as sufficient justification to deny or re-
move custody of children.7 6 Likewise, it is not logical to deny a ho-
mosexual father custody simply because his activity may constitute
some form of minimal criminal behavior.
Courts may also view the homosexual father as mentally ill and
deny custody on the basis of the parent's mental illness. It has be-
come widely accepted, however, that homosexuality is not a mental
illness. The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexual-
ity from its list of mental illnesses in 1980. 77 Although courts in gen-
eral have been relatively slow to recognize that homosexuality is not
a mental disorder, the homosexual father seeking custody should ad-
dress the judiciary's fear with scientific data and studies that
Conkel, 31 Ohio App.3d 169, 509 N.E.2d 983 (1987) (court stating that no proof exists that
homosexual parents leading to homosexual children).
73. See J.L.P.(H) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that the
father is an overt homosexual attempting to convert his son); Roberts v. Roberts, 22 Ohio
App.3d 127, 489 N.E.2d 1067 (1985) (finding that the father brought forth no expert testi-
mony that his homosexual home environment would not be adverse to the child).
74. See statutes cited supra note 23.
75. See Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 728, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985) (stating that "[tihe
conduct inherent in the father's [homosexual] relationship is punishable as a class six felony [1
to 5 years imprisonment and/or up to $1000 fine] which is prosecuted with considerable fre-
quency and vigor .... "); Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 284 S.E.2d 744 (1981).
76. See SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 35, at 25-26, 43-46, 51-54. See also L. WEI-
THORN, supra note 3, at 86-89.
77. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, D.S.M. III: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 281-82, 380 (3d ed. 1980). Regardless of a mental
illness diagnosis, courts have determined that mental illness per se is not a valid reason to deny
custody. See NEW TRENDS, supra note 36, at 95. See also A. BELL & M. WEINBERG,
HOMOSEXUALITIES 196-97 (1978). The authors state:
Surely the time has come for psychiatry to give up the archaic practice of
classifying millions of men and women who accept or prefer homosexual object
choices as being, by virtue of that fact alone, mentally ill. The fact that alterna-
tive lifestyles happen to be out of favor with current cultural conventions must
not be a basis in itself for a diagnosis of pathology.
Id. Further, our judiciary has recognized that mental illness is not a per se valid reason for
denying custody. See NEW TRENDS, supra note 36 at 45.
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strongly disprove any assumption that homosexuals are mentally ill.
D. Fear of Social Intolerance
Many courts also fear that granting custody of children to a
homosexual father will develop in the child a social tolerance for ho-
mosexuality.7 This fear stems from the notion that homosexuality is
rare but that, if society tolerates the practice, the rate of homosexu-
ality in society will rise.79 While courts admittedly do have legiti-
mate concerns in serving the best interests of the child, courts that
determine custody in order to mold young minds to ensure that chil-
dren's private views will conform with those of the majority of soci-
ety arguably overstep the boundaries of their judicial authority."0
The propriety of the judiciary's implementing local community
standards, such as community intolerance of homosexuality, in child
custody determinations when fundamental rights, such as the right
to rear a child as one sees fit8 l and the right for a child to form his
own views on society, are involved, is certainly questionable. Indeed,
a court's implementation of an irrational social intolerance in deny-
ing a homosexual father custody of his child only perpetuates the
problem, for local community standards, even though held by the
majority of persons, are not always correct.82
78. See M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982).
79. Warner, Homophobia. Manifest Homosexuals and Political Activity: A New Ap-
proach to Gay Rights and the "Issue" of Homosexuality, II GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 635, 653
(1981).
The reasons for the myth that homosexuality is rare are readily understand-
able. Societal intolerance creates oppression. Oppression is internalized as re-
pression that exacts a toll on the psychological health and emotional well-being
of the homosexual individual. This repression results in the attempt to pass in
the straight world and encourages invisibility.
Invisibility fosters stereotypes. Popular images of homosexual individuals as
being inherently and recognizably different serve to rationalize intolerance. So
long as societal intolerance causes homosexual individuals to remain closeted,
the majority will continue to believe that homosexuality is rare, that homosexu-
als are immediately identifiable, and that the average person never comes to
know or contact homosexual people.
Id.
80. See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (reversing a decision that had
divested natural mother of child custody because of mother's interracial remarriage).
81. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a statute limit-
ing foreign language instruction in schools was not a valid exercise of police power).
82. Hitchens, Martin & Morgan, Child Custody and the Homosexual Parent, JUDGES
J. 33, 35 (Fall 1979).
The idea that community standards should be a factor to be considered in
making a child custody determination is distressing. Allowing a majority to
make decisions about a minority group in society can result in a great miscar-
riage of justice . . . .There are any number of lifestyles or situations of which a
majority in the community might disapprove . . . .The application of commu-
nity standards to child custody cases would obviously be inappropriate to the
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Rather than perpetuating societal intolerance, our courts should
seek to alleviate it. Such a role by the judiciary is not unprecedented.
In recent years, the judiciary has taken the lead in alleviating social
intolerance based on race," gender,") alienage,85 and illegitimacy.1
6
Similarly, courts should seek to alleviate the social intolerance of
homosexuals. A starting point could be child custody proceedings,
where judges may begin by showing impartiality to the sexual pref-
erences of the parents involved.
A few courts have indeed taken such a stand. In Conkel v. Con-
kel,8 7 an Ohio Appellate Court sustained a homosexual father's right
to overnight visitation with his children. The court reasoned that
"[t]his court cannot take into consideration the unpopularity of
homosexuals in society when its duty is to facilitate and guard a fun-
damental parent-child relationship."88 Similarly in M.P. v.S.P.,s9
the New Jersey Superior Court refused to remove custody of chil-
dren from a homosexual mother and award it to the father. The
court stated that the children may emerge from custody with the
homosexual mother as better equipped to deal with society, moral
judgments of right and wrong, sentiment and prejudices, and the ra-
tionality of public standards.9 0 The court, suggesting that the chil-
dren could in fact benefit from being raised by a homosexual parent,
recognized that "neither the prejudices of the small community in
which they live nor the curiosity of their peers about [the mother's]
sexual nature will be abated by a change of custody."91
Conversely, some appellate courts have upheld trial court deter-
minations that have denied custody to homosexual parents on the
basis of preventing a child's tolerance to homosexuality. For exam-
ple, in M.J.P. v. J.G.P.,92 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
vast majority of these situations.
Id.
83. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that race is a
suspect class in education). See also R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
84. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding that gender is an intermedi-
ate level suspect classification).
85. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding that alienage is an intermedi-
ate level suspect classification).
86. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional a state
statute imposing a two-year statute of limitations on paternity and child support actions on
behalf of illegitimate children).
87. 31 Ohio App.3d 169, 509 N.E.2d 983 (1987).
88. Id. at 173, 509 N.E.2d at 987.
89. 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (App. Div. 1979).
90. Id. at 438, 404 A.2d at 1263.
91. Id. at 436, 404 A.2d at 1262.
92. 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982).
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mother's homosexual relationship was an adequate change of condi-
tion to render a child custody modification. The court stated that
"[the child] would have no idea that the [homosexual] behavior was
not morally accepted by society.""3
There is no legitimate justification for courts to uphold irra-
tional societal fears such as social intolerance of homosexuals.9" Ho-
mosexual fathers should not be denied custody of their children sim-
ply because society does not approve of homosexuality. There is no
proof that children of homosexuals will tolerate homosexuality more
in the future. It is not of any legitimate public concern to attempt to
prevent such tolerance. Thus, the fear that children of homosexual
parents will become tolerant of the practice is both an irrational and
unacceptable basis for judicial decision-making.
E. Social Harassment of Children
Lastly, courts have denied custody to homosexual fathers on the
basis of future social harassment of the children. 95 Of all the fears in
which courts presently indulge, it is the fear of social harassment
that has legitimacy. Under the Best Interests Doctrine, courts have
discretion in determining the physical, mental, and emotional well-
being of the child,90 and any parental rights are secondary to the
rights of the child.9 7 There are, however, three areas of weakness in
the judiciary's denial of custody based upon possible social harass-
ment of the child that should be emphasized by the homosexual fa-
ther seeking custody.
First, the homosexual father must insist that the court not ac-
cept the social harassment argument per se without any thorough
investigation. 98 He must ensure that the court performed adequate
investigation, interviewing, and research of all parties to determine
the presence of significant harassment.
Second, if there is some harassment present, the court needs to
determine whether such harassment is avoidable by denying the ho-
93. Id. at 969.
94. Some observers label a generalized societal fear or anxiety about sexual behavior as
"erotophobia." "Homophobia" is one expression of this general cultural fear, which is deeply
rooted in religious tradition. See W. CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES: A
CROSS-CULTURAL AND CROSS-SPECIES INVESTIGATION 71 (1967).
95. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d
966 (Okla. 1982).
96. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. For instances of judicial acceptance of thinly substantiated social harassment argu-
ments, see Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966
(Okla. 1982).
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mosexual father custody. Social harassment of the child might arise
not only by living with a homosexual parent, but simply from having
a homosexual parent." Barring custody will not remove the children
from the harassment and prejudices of society, or as one court has
phrased it, the "slings and arrows of a disapproving society."' 100 In
fact, if the parent/child relationship is positive, loving, and caring,
its benefits will far outweigh any societal ostracism that might occur.
"Simply put, it is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined so-
cial stigma attaching to [a parent's] status as a [homosexual]. '
Indeed, the greatest problem for children in the custody of a homo-
sexual father stems from the general difficulties of single parent
households and not from the parent's sexual orientation or from sub-
sequent harassment of the children.102
Finally, courts may not give effect to any private bias in a cus-
tody proceeding, a rule required by the Supreme Court case of Pal-
more v. Sidoti.'03 Palmore involved a Florida custody battle between
a mother and father, both white, following a divorce. The court
awarded custody of the child to the mother, who then married a
black man. The trial court later awarded custody to the natural fa-
ther on the basis of the social stigma the child would face having a
black stepfather and an interracial family. The Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, unanimously reversed104 and held
that private bias cannot be enforced by the law. It emphasized that
"[tihe Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot directly or indirectly give them effect."105 Thus,
to deny a homosexual father his right to custody on the fear of social
harassment to the child is effectively legalizing a private societal
bias.
While the judiciary does have a legitimate interest in protecting
children from harassment, to deny custody on this basis, a particular
99. See Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosex-
ual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497, 532
(1984).
100. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 81. See also Conkel v. Conkel, 31 Ohio App.3d 169, 173,
509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (1987).
101. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985).
102. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in
the United States 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 893 n.569 (1979).
103. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
104. Id. at 434.
105. Id. at 433. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (requiring the courts to
make "individualized determinations" of parental fitness in custody proceedings and not to
classify any group as per se unfit).
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court must find that denying custody will curtail the harassment and
that such denial does not legalize private bias. Two courts have
taken the view that harassment inevitably comes to the child and
that denying custody to a homosexual parent will not alleviate the
pressure."0 6 In fact, one court has stressed that harassment might be
beneficial for the child in dealing with society and in developing his
or her own views of their parents, their peers, and society as
whole.107 In short, without a showing of an adequate causal connec-
tion between a father's homosexuality and avoidable adverse effects
on the child, the judicial fear of social harassment of the child is
without foundation and may not be used to deny custody to homo-
sexual fathers.
V. Methods of Relief for the Homosexual Father
After learning the nature of child custody proceedings and dis-
arming the homophobic fears of the court, the homosexual father
must choose the approach he will use to persuade the court that he
should be granted custody. The best approach for the homosexual
father is a two-pronged attack addressing both the interests of the
child and the rights of the homosexual father.
A. Primary Argument-The Interests of the Child and the Nexus
Requirement
Because courts are primarily interested in the welfare of the
children whose interests they guard, the homosexual father must first
address those interests and require the court that seeks to deny him
custody to find a correlation or nexus between the sexual preference
of the father and any adverse effect on the child. The case of Bezio
v. Patenaude'08 is the breakthrough case in the application of this
nexus test. In Bezio, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
stated that the homosexual mother's sexual preference is per se irrel-
evant to her parenting skills, and, in order to prove her unfit, affirm-
ative proof that her sexual preference of homosexuality is detrimen-
tal to the child is necessary. In awarding custody to the lesbian
mother, the court stated that "[t]here is no evidence that children
who are raised with a loving couple of the same sex are any more
106. See M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 436-39, 404 A.2d 1256, 1262-63 (App. Div.
1979); M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc.2d 317, 322-25, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963-64 (1986).
107. See M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. at 436, 404 A.2d at 1262 (explaining that
"[t]hese are matters which courts cannot control, and there is little to gain by creating an
artificial world where the children may dream that life is different than it is.").
108. 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980).
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disturbed, unhealthy, maladjusted than children raised with a loving
couple of mixed sex."' 9
Since Bezio, the nexus test has become accepted by a growing
number of jurisdictions."' Many states, however, remain reluctant
to apply the nexus test, including Pennsylvania. For example, in
Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 111 the Pennsylvania Superior Court re-
fused to apply the nexus test and denied a lesbian mother expanded
custody of her children. While the court stated that homosexuality
per se was not the basis for denying custody, the court viewed homo-
sexuality as a relevant factor in determining custody without requir-
ing a correlation, under the Bezio standard, between that homosexu-
ality and adverse effects on the children.1
2
Similarly, in Pascarella v. Pascarella,113 the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court, in denying a homosexual father partial custody of his
child, cited with approval the Constant A. decision. While the court
in Pascarella paid lip service to an undefined correlation require-
ment, actual proof of the effect on the children was unclear. Further,
the court refused to recognize the formal nexus test of Bezio v.
Patenaude.11"4
Indeed, even when the nexus test is utilized by the custody
court, there is no guarantee of success for the homosexual father.
There remain a few more roadblocks under the test itself that the
homosexual father must address. First, allocation of the burden of
proof presents a problem. Many times, when a heterosexual parent
attempts to modify or remove custody from a homosexual parent, the
homosexual must meet a heightened burden of proof.'" The homo-
sexual father is required not only to prove his ability to provide sub-
stantial physical support and his proper emotional ties with the child
109. Id. at 574, 410 N.E.2d at 1215-16.
110. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (sustaining lesbian
mother's custody because father failed to prove a correlation between the mother's sexual pref-
erence and adverse effects on the child); M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc.2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960
(1986) (applying the nexus test to grant homosexual father custody of his son); Conkel v.
Conkel, 31 Ohio App.3d 169, 509 N.E.2d 983 (1987) (granting homosexual father overnight
visitation with sons because mother failed to meet her burden of proof); Stroman v. Williams,
291 S.C. 376, 353 S.E.2d 704 (1987) (upholding custody of lesbian mother because father did
not meet burden of proving an adverse effect on child); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100
Wash.2d 325, 669 P.2d 886 (1983) (granting homosexual father increased visitation rights
with his child).
Il1. 344 Pa. Super. 49, 496 A.2d 1 (1985).
112. Id. at 66, 496 A.2d at 9, 10.
113. 355 Pa. Super. 5, 512 A.2d 715 (1986).
114. Id. at 8-9, 512 A.2d at 716-17.
115. See generally J.L.P.(H) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); M.A.B. v.
R.B., 134 Misc.2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1986); Roberts v. Roberts, 22 Ohio App.3d 127,
489 N.E.2d 1067 (1985); A. v. A., 15 Or. App. 353, 514 P.2d 358 (1973).
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but also to address the issue of his homosexuality. Although logi-
cally, when the homosexual father defends his right to sustain cus-
tody, the burden of proof should rest with the plaintiff, many courts
require the homosexual to prove that there will be no adverse effects
on the child. 116 Such a requirement contrasts sharply with the typi-
cal modification proceeding, in which the parent seeking a change in
custody must prove a significant change of circumstances since the
original custody order.11 7 The homosexual father should be cognizant
that he may have the burden of proof, regardless of whether he is
the. plaintiff or the defendant.11 Strong expert testimony most likely
will be needed to reverse the court's misconceptions of homosexuality
and to present the homosexual father as a loving, caring, and fit
parent.
A second roadblock for gay fathers, even under the nexus test,
is the gender factor. More courts have granted lesbian mothers the
right to custody of their children than have granted custody to ho-
mosexual fathers.1 9 This difference may stem from a number of rea-
sons. First, homosexual men may be less desirous of rearing their
children, and thus, they may not pursue custody at the same rate as
lesbian mothers. The homosexual father may choose to stay in the
closet and to preserve his sexual privacy rather than making it public
by way of a custody proceeding. According to some, homosexual fa-
thers are in a "double closet," where "[s]ociety shuns them because
they are gay, and other gays shun them because they are fathers."' 0
Thus, the homosexual father may be less likely to come forward in a
custody situation.
Second, there may be more societal tolerance of lesbian mothers
than of homosexual fathers. Such a dichotomy could stem from the
history of the sexes,' the past treatment of women, and a linger
116. See cases cited supra note 115.
117. See, e.g., A. v. A., 15 Or. App. 353, 514 P.2d 358 (1973). Prior to an initial cus-
tody order being entered by the court, both parents stand on equal footing and carry an equal
burden in establishing the best interests of the child. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson,
470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977) (stating the general law on burden of proof in custody
matters).
118. The American Psychological Association Council of Representatives believes that
the burden of proof on the homosexual parent should not be any higher than on any other
parent in a child custody case. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Associa-
tion, Incorporated for the Year 1976: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of Rep-
resentatives 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 432 (1977).
119. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (outlining case law on the topic).
120. Suesoff, supra note 64, at 875.
121. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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ing presence of the Tender Years doctrine. 123 This difference may
also be because lesbian women will expose their sexual preference
more freely in a custody case."2 4 Finally, there is the notion that
homosexual men are unstable and always sexually active, while les-
bian women tend to involve themselves in more permanent relation-
ships.' 25 As more and more homosexual fathers are willing to reveal
their sexual preference and fight for custody, it will be easier to eval-
uate whether there is an actual preference toward lesbian mother or
rather a simple lack of interest by homosexual fathers in custody.
Until that time, the best primary approach for the homosexual
father seeking custody is to argue that the court should use the
nexus test. With this test, homosexuality does not equate with per se
unfitness. Rather, the test requires a correlation between the father's
sexual preference and the best interests of the child. If the litigant
father first understands the court's fears of how homosexuality af-
fects the best interests of the child, he can refute them and argue
that there is no actual and demonstrable adverse effect on the child
because of the father's sexual preference.
B. Secondary Arguments-Parental Rights
1. Constitutional Protections.-It must again be noted that
parental rights in a custody suit are secondary to the best interests of
the child, as the state maintains a compelling interest in protecting
the rights of the child.'2 Nevertheless, by addressing, as a secondary
argument, parental rights, the homosexual father informs the court
that on the whole, homosexuals are being treated unfairly in custody
battles.2 7
(a) Right to Privacy.-Some of that unfairness and inequal-
ity may be implicated in the right to privacy. The homosexual father
may argue that the right to privacy protects certain fundamental
personal liberties from undue government interference. The crucial
question, however, is whether homosexuality is a fundamental per-
sonal liberty that is protected by the right to privacy. While the right
123. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
124. See generally S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985); Nadler v. Superior
Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967); Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563,
410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980); Stroman v. Williams, 291 S.C. 376, 353 S.E.2d 704 (1987).
125. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
127. "[Hlomosexuals share with other minority groups a 'legacy of subordination' - a
tradition of expecting prejudice and harsh treatment as they go about their daily lives - and
this is an important concern for social justice." A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra note 32, at
121-22 (citation omitted).
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to privacy has grown significantly in the last 25 years through the
cases of Griswold v. Connecticut,128 Eisenstadt v. Baird,'29 and Roe
v. Wade,' its growth came to a sudden halt when the right was
asked to protect the conduct of homosexuals in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.13  In upholding the validity of a Georgia statute criminalizing
consensual homosexual acts, 32 the Court in Bowers reasoned that
consensual homosexual acts do not fall within the range of protected
activity under the right to privacy analysis. 3
Thus, the privacy argument for the homosexual father falters.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court clearly stated its intention not to ex-
pand the privacy right to include homosexual conduct. Therefore,
the homosexual father who uses the right to privacy argument in a
custody proceeding will most likely be unsuccessful.
(b) Equal Protection/Quasi-Suspect Class.-The superior
approach for the homosexual father to employ is one based upon the
equal protection clause of the constitution.3s Under an equal protec-
tion analysis, a homosexual father can argue that he, as a homosex-
ual, is part of a suspect or "quasi-suspect" class. 3 5 Ordinarily ap-
plied when dealing with classifications based on gender, 3 6 the quasi-
suspect level of scrutiny appears most appropriate for homosexuals
128. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court developed a right to privacy through
the "emanations and penumbras" analysis of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amend-
ments. The Court applied the "zone of privacy" analysis to strike down a Connecticut statute
barring the use of contraceptives by married couples, Id. at 484.
129. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (applying the Griswold analysis to strike down a statute bar-
ring distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples).
130. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (applying the right to privacy analysis to strike down a Texas
statute criminalizing abortion).
131. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
132. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). It provides: "(a) A person commits the of-
fense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mother or anus of another .... " Id.
133. 478 U.S. at - , 106 S. Ct. at 2844. Those activities deemed to be protected have
included child rearing and education, family relationships, procreation, marriage, contracep-
tion, and abortion. See also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), in which a
U.S. Court of Appeals found that Army regulations which disqualify persons of homosexual
orientation from serving in the Army discriminate against a suspect class without promoting a
compelling governmental interest in violation of the fifth amendment equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Recently, the Supreme Court in Webster v. Doe, 56 U.S.L.W. No. 86-1294
(June 15, 1988) remanded to the District Court with orders to address a constitutional claim
of a homosexual who was terminated from employment by the Central Intelligence Agency
Director William H. Webster, pursuant to Section 102(c) of the National Security Act, which
states that the Director may, in his discretion, terminate employment whenever he shall deem
such necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. id.
134. See infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
135. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (detailing the criteria for suspectness at
the intermediate level of scrutiny).
136. See supra note 83.
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under an equal protection analysis.13 7
2. Criteria for Intermediate Scrutiny.-For a classification to
qualify for intermediate level scrutiny, that classification must be
based upon an immutable trait."3 8 While sexual preference on its
face seems alterable, most studies indicate that it is quite difficult to
change. Most psychologists conclude that homosexuality is usually
too deeply ingrained to alter.'" Recent studies have indicated that in
humans homosexuality may result from a genetic disposition.140 As
to reversal of homosexuality, Sigmund Freud, commenting upon the
reversibility of homosexuality, stated that "[i]n a certain number of
cases we succeed in developing the blighted germs of heterosexual
tendencies which are present in every homosexual; in the majority of
cases it is no more possible . . ."I'll
The question of immutability has two points of argument. First,
if homosexuality is reversible, the process will be performed at great
cost to the individual. For example, although gender and skin color
are realistically mutable traits in light of modern medical technol-
ogy,'42 they cannot be altered without drastic and costly measures.
Similarly, the homosexual should not be made to alter a trait when
the costs of doing so would far exceed any personal benefit. Thus,
homosexuality should be viewed as immutable, and any argument
137. See generally Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Height-
ened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 811
(1984).
138. See Watkins v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (outlining an excel-
lent framework for an equal protection argument applicable to homosexuals).
139. SEXUAL PREFERENCE, supra note 63, at 190-91, 211, 217. Attempts to alter homo-
sexuality are almost always doomed for failure. See M. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE
HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 138 (1973); see generally C. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX
(1975). See Watkins v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that
"... '[i]mmutability' may describe those traits that are so central to a person's identity that it
would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regard-
less of how easy that change might be physically . . . [w]e have no trouble concluding that
sexual orientation is immutable for the purpose of equal protection doctrine.").
140. See generally SEXUAL PREFERENCE, supra note 63. Sigmund Freud recorded his
beliefs that some females were physically predisposed to be lesbians. In a letter to the mother
of a homosexual seeking to have the child converted, Freud wrote, "By asking me if I can help,
you mean, I suppose, if I can abolish homosexuality and make normal heterosexuality take its
place. The answer is, in a general way, we cannot promise to achieve it." V. BULLOUGH, supra
note 11, at 154. See also Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1447-48 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating that social, economic, and political pressures to conceal one's homosexuality
commonly deter many gays from openly advocating pro-homosexual legislation, thus intensify-
ing their inability to make effective use of the political process."). Even when homosexuals do
break the political barriers, elected officials usually follow public prejudice and refuse to sup-
port legislation condoning homosexuality. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
141. S. Freud, Historical Notes: A Letter from Freud, AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 107, 786-
87 (1951).
142. For example, sex-change operations, cosmetics or surgery can later gender and race
characteristics.
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that homosexuality is a matter of choice should not be considered.
Second, assuming that homosexuality evolves partly from hered-
itary factors and partly from environmental ones, the question arises
as to whether the uncontrolled or hereditary influence makes the
whole trait immutable.143 To draw a line in determining that immu-
table traits can only be those which are obviously physically inher-
ited (e.g., gender, race) seems illogical. There are many physical
traits which are unlikely as the basis of discrimination, such as eye
color, baldness and height. Likewise, there are many nonphysical
traits that seem to subject people to discrimination, such as religion
and wealth. Thus, it is not the physical aspects of homosexuality
which are suspect, but rather the treatment of those aspects in soci-
ety. Under this analysis, sexual orientation should be viewed in the
same light as gender and race for its suspect nature, regardless of
alterability.
The question of immutability is by far the thorniest point for
the homosexual arguing for heightened scrutiny under an equal pro-
tection analysis. The questions of the alterability of and choice of
homosexuality rest on facts brought out by the scientific community,
which is now debating the origin of the homosexual trait. 44 It does
appear that the trait is alterable only at great expense to the individ-
ual, and therefore the "choice" argument is irrelevant simply be-
cause the equal protection clause protects specifically disadvantaged
groups. To distinguish between gays who choose the trait and gays
who genetically inherit it would be too difficult to police. Hence, im-
mutability standards should not be read so strictly as to reject homo-
sexuality as an immutable trait.
3. History of Discrimination/Politically Powerless.-In addi-
tion to immutability, a finding of suspectness requires that the group
have a past history of discrimination and that the group be a politi-
cally powerless minority. 4 5 Most people would agree that homosexu-
als have had a past history of discrimination. 4 6 Likewise, homosexu-
als have previously had little if any political clout. Few homosexuals
serve in the legislature, and still many heterosexual legislators fear
taking any political action in support of the homosexual cause for
143. See Delgado, Fact, Norm and Standard of Review - The Case of Homosexuality,
10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 575, 583-85 (1985).
144. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
145. See Watkins v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988).
146. See supra notes 11-34 and accompanying text.
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fear of societal repercussions.' 4 For example, three days after the
October 11, 1987 gay rights march on Washington, D.C., North
Carolina Senator Jesse Helms led a drive that resulted in a 94-2
rejection in the Senate of money for any AIDS education material
that condoned homosexual activity.148 "We have to call a spade a
spade," said Helms, "and a perverted human being a perverted
human being."' 49 Thus, the homosexual has both a prior history of
discrimination and is a politically powerless minority.80
4. Incorrect Stereotypes/Stigma.-Another criterion for sus-
pectness is that the group be subjected to incorrect stigma.'"' As
previously stated, homosexuals have been viewed as molesters of
children, as mentally ill, as criminals, and as active recruiters for
others to adopt their sexual preferences.151 These incorrect stereo-
types have persisted throughout different cultures in history. Just as
untrue stigmatization was the key focal point in the fight for black
rights,153 so too is it a key point for homosexuals. Homosexuals are
no more prone to molest children, to be mentally unstable, or to en-
gage in criminal activity than any other group in society. Similar
arguments were raised about blacks'M before their massive move-
ment for rights in the 1960s, and, of course, were sharply disproven.
Thus, the homosexual has been the subject of past erroneous stere-
otyping and meets the final criterion for treatment as a suspect class.
5. Summary.-Homosexuality can fit into the required crite-
147. Legislators may fear repercussions from conservative political or religious groups.
Thus, legislators simply try to avoid supporting such controversial issues. See supra note 138
and accompanying text.
148. Cannon, Congressional Votes Suggest Gays Only Slowly Winning Political Gains,
Phila. lnq., Oct. 25, 1987, at 5-E, col. 1.
149. Id.
150. See generally U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), in which
Chief Justice Stone suggested a heightened scrutiny for politically powerless minorities by stat-
ing that "[PIrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relief upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry." Id.
151. Watkins v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988).
152. See supra notes 60-65, 74-77 and accompanying text. See also Watkins v. U.S.
Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1988). "[T]he discrimination faced by homosexuals
in our society is plainly no less pernicious or intense than the discrimination faced by other
groups already treated as suspect classes . . . . Sexual orientation plainly has no relevance to
a person's 'ability to perform or contribute to society.'"
153. See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975) (detailing the struggle for deseg-
regation in schools).
154. Id. Stereotypes about blacks included the notion that blacks were mentally inferior
to whites, that blacks were dirty and evil persons, and that blacks were barbaric.
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ria for heightened scrutiny. Homosexuals have an immutable trait
and a history of discrimination. They are politically powerless and
have been the victims of incorrect stereotypes. Reaping the benefits
of the heightened scrutiny that suspect classes enjoy, the homosexual
father can utilize the equal protection analysis as a secondary argu-
ment in a child custody proceeding, to prove discrimination on the
basis of both his gender and his homosexuality. Under a two-prong
attack focusing on the father's right to be free from discrimination
and the best interests of the child, the homosexual father will have a
strong method of attacking the validity of the judiciary's use of his
sexual orientation as a bar to his having custody of his children.
VI. Conclusion
There are presently millions of homosexual parents in the
United States. Many raise their children with no state interven-
tion. 15 5 When the right to raise one's child is determined in a hotly-
contested child custody proceeding, however, the homosexual father
faces a double-barreled societal and judicial intolerance: 156 he is a
father, and he is a homosexual.
Fortunately, the homosexual father today need not mourn in
solitude as did Oscar Wilde. Judicial precedent and scientific data
permit the homosexual father to attack successfully past societal in-
tolerances and misconceptions about homosexuals. All that the ho-
mosexual father needs is willingness and careful preparation. It will
only take a few such fathers to transform a lifetime of infinite dis-
tress into the sharing of a lifetime of everlasting joy with their
children.
Darryl Robin Wishard
155. Some homosexual parents stay married until children reach majority age; some
parents split amicably and work out agreements; and some simply hide their sexual preferences
from family and society. Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 102, at 884.
156. Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: Gay Rights Biggest Roadblock, Civ. LIB. REV.
Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 19, 26.
"[T]he gay rights attorney must be contended with confronting the real
possibility that the judge is guilty of homophobic, stereotypical thinking ....
The process need not and, of course, should not be put in the form of an attack
on the judge; but . . the attorney must attack the past thinking of many
judges.
Id.
